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Historical Determinism in the Constitutions of the United States and the 
Spanish of 1812
José Antonio Gurpegui1
Abstract. The Constitution of the United States has not been a document specially referred to, nor 
considered, by Spanish academics who have studied the Constitution of 1812. Even the constitutionalists 
gathered in Cádiz fled from anything that could evoke a republican and federalist constitution being 
their purpose radically different. In a general way, it has been the French Constitution of 1791, the 
reference text “par excellece”. But, beyond the liberal principles that Americans and most of the 
Spaniards embraced, there were some historical coincidences in the United States and Spain which 
conditioned in a similar way the final result of both political documents.
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[es] El determinismo histórico en las Constituciones de Estados Unidos y 
Española de 1812
Resumen. La Constitución de los Estados Unidos no ha sido un documento especialmente referencial, 
o considerado, por los académicos españoles estudiosos de la Constitución de 1812. Incluso los propios 
constitucionalistas reunidos en Cádiz huían de cuanto pudiera aludir una constitución republicana y 
federalista cuando su propósito era radicalmente distinto. De forma general ha sido tradicionalmente 
la Constitución Francesa de 1791 el texto evocado por antonomasia. Sin embargo, tanto en Estados 
Unidos como en España, se produjeron una serie de coincidencias históricas que, más allá de los 
principios liberales que los americanos y buena parte de los españoles abrazaban, condicionaron de 
forma similar el resultado final de ambos documentos políticos. 
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1. State of the question
The constitutions of the United States and France were already in force when the 
Spanish constitutionalists met in Cádiz in 1812. The hypothetical influence that the 
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French model, in addition to the English legislation, had on the first Spanish consti-
tution has been a recurrent academic field for debate. Less interest has inspired the 
Constitution of the United States. 
1.1. French Constitution and British laws
It has been traditionally considered that the French Constitution of 17912 was the 
reference document that illuminated the deputies gathered in Cádiz in 1812. Two 
years after our constitution was drafted, Father Vélez published a 20-page pamphlet 
in which he compared both constitutions showing the influence that the French had 
had on the Spanish. Miguel de Burgos, translator of the French Constitution into 
Spanish, also echoed such influence,
 
Empéñanse algunos en que la constitución española tiene mucho de la célebre que 
los franceses no supieron conservar. Otros pretenden que la nuestra sea original. 
Para que todos cotejen y se desengañen sale la presente traducción.3 
It was “checked” by Karl Marx himself; he questioned those who defended that the 
Constitution of 1812 was “a mere imitation of the French Constitution of 1791, 
transplanted on the Spanish soil by visionaries, regardless of the historical traditions 
of Spain”; Marx understood that it was “a genuine and original offspring of Spanish 
intellectual life, regenerating the ancient and national institutions, introducing the 
measures of reform loudly demanded by the most celebrated authors and statesmen 
of the eighteenth century, making inevitable concessions to popular prejudice.” (5) 4 
In any case, the influence of the French constitutional texts has been an essen-
tial and significant point of debate among scholars of the Spanish text. Pedro Cruz 
Villalón in “La Constitución de 1808 en perspectiva comparada” mentions the 
French referent stating that the Estatuto de Bayona, previous the Constitution of 
1812 and that he considers with the rank of Constitution, belongs to a singular 
genre that he calls “Napoleonic Constitutionalism” to which the Spanish also be-
longed: “Desde luego, no es polémico que la Constitución española de 1808 pert-
enece a un `género´, tal como no ha habido más remedio que adelantar ya, como es 
el del `constitucionalismo napoleónico´” (84). Marta Friera Álvarez and Ignacio 
Fernández Sarasola, defend in “La opción patriótica: las Cortes de Cádiz y la Con-
stitución de 1812” that “Los puntos de conexión entre el texto gaditano y la Con-
stitución francesa de 1791 son bastante evidentes...”; an appreciation similar to 
that of Joaquín Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, who in “Las Cortes de Cádiz y la Con-
stitución de 1812” states,
2 Spanish scholars usually refer to this constitution, although those of 1793 and 1795 are also punctually men-
tioned.
3 Quoted in Jairdilson Da Paz Silva, 44.
4 In New York Daily Tribune, November 20, 1854. Quoted in Adam Sharman and Stephen G.H. Roberts, 
“Introduction: Put in Writing”. Marx’s rhetoric is at least “singular” due to its imperialist evocations: “From 
the remote angle of the Gaditana Island they undertook to lay the foundation of a new Spain, as their fore-
fathers had done from the mountains of Covadonga and Sobrarbe. How are we to account for the curious 
phenomenon of the Constitution of 1812, afterward branded by the crowned heads of Europe, assembled at 
Verona.” See https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1854/revolutionary-spain/ch06.htm. Transla-
tion into Spanish at http://www.izca.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=191:karl-marx-
&catid=14:formacion
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No resulta extraño, por todo ello, que el modelo constitucional más influyente 
entre los liberales doceañistas fuese el que se había vertebrado en Francia a partir 
de la Declaración de Derechos de 1789 y de la Constitución de 1791. Un texto este 
último que se tuvo muy en cuenta a la hora de redactar la Constitución española de 
1812, aunque entre ambos códigos haya notables diferencias, como luego se ten-
drá oportunidad de comprobar. (195)
Similar approach expresses Emilio La Parra in the “Introducción” to La libertad de 
prensa en las Cortes de Cádiz, because even assuming the similarity of our constitu-
tion with the French one, there are important differences between both.
En primer lugar, sus decisiones legislativas son menos radicales; predomina, mu-
cho más que en el caso francés, el compromiso entre las fuerzas revolucionarias y 
las tradicionalistas y, sobre todo, quedó circunscrita al nivel teórico, pues la inci-
dencia en la transformación efectiva del país fue escasa. (3)
The British model, on the other hand, was the favorite of the anglophile Jovellanos. 
It might be because the figure of the monarch was incorporated and, in addition, due 
to its bicameral system granting the aristocracy a legislative capacity. Taking into 
account the Spanish singularity, this could satisfy the legislative demands that the 
new times required.5 Furthermore, as Varela points out, “Los diputados realistas 
mostraron sus simpatías por el constitucionalismo inglés  [ ]Los diputados liberales 
tenían en alta estima ciertos aspectos del constitucionalismo británico, como el Jura-
do y la libertad de Imprenta...” (194).6 In Spain the purpose was not to overthrow the 
monarchy as it was in France and America,7 but to end with the absolutism of the 
previous regime by establishing a “Monarquía moderada” as will be seen later. Fran-
cisco Tomás y Valiente in Génesis de la Constitution de 1812 points out how the 
principles of our text were inspired from the same sources as the British legislation. 
The British based their laws on the customary rights being the king, who played a 
secondary role, its depositary - the historical “Common Laws” were similar to the 
Spanish Leyes Fundamentales-. In short, what the Spanish constitutionalists pre-
tended, implicitly evoking those British principles, was a “construcción entre históri-
ca y mítica, vigente y difundida por la Europa de la segunda mitad del XVIII y va a 
pesar, con su prestigio que la convierte en modelo a imitar, sobre muchos de nuestros 
reformitas más moderados, desde el Arzobispo de Santiago de Compostela en 1810 
hasta Jovellanos” (15-16). This potential influence of British laws in the Spanish 
Constitution has been studied, among others, by Manuel Moreno Alonso in “Suger-
encias inglesas para unas cortes españolas”; and also by Varela in “Un precursor de 
la monarquía parlamentaria: Blanco-White y `El Español´ (1810-1814)”, and “El 
5 Varela states: “A este respecto, trajeron [los realistas] a colación la teoría de los cuerpos intermedios, acuñada 
por el autor del Espíritu de las Leyes, e insistieron no tanto en la importancia de un ejecutivo monárquico fuer-
te al estilo del británico, cuanto en la necesidad de una representación especial para la nobleza y sobre todo para 
el clero, estamento al que pertenecía buena parte de los realistas. Una representación especial, similar a la cá-
mara de los Lores, que Jovellanos había defendido en su mencionada Memoria.” (Las Cortes de Cádiz y la 
Constitución de 1812, 194).
6 In Las Cortes de Cádiz y la Constitución de 1812.
7 When using “America” I will always refer to the United States. 
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debate sobre el sistema británico de gobierno en España durante el primer tercio del 
Siglo XIX.”8 
Nevertheless, there is a certain consensus in recognizing the French influence 
over the hypothetical one of the British. French professor Gérard Dufour,9 inter-
viewed by the Asturian newspaper La Nueva España, is skeptical about the possibil-
ity that British legislation influenced the constitutionalists in Cadiz. The interviewer 
asks him if his approaches did not “underestimate” the English influence in the nine-
tieth constitutional text, to which he replies: “España sacó de Inglaterra el oro y las 
tropas de Wellington, que no es poco. Pero las ideas en España proceden más bien 
del bando favorable a la Constitución francesa de 1791, que está entre 1789 y la 
Revolución popular y la República de 1792 y el posterior terror, que por supuesto se 
rechaza completamente. Lógico, fue escalofriante.”10 Regarding this matter, Varela 
is particularly conclusive in “Los modelos constitucionales en las Cortes de Cádiz”,
 
mientras la evolución de la Monarquía inglesa había transcurrido por unos der-
roteros muy distintos a los de la española, entre ésta y la francesa existía un indud-
able paralelismo desde comienzos del siglo XVIII. Un factor que unido al influjo 
notable del pensamiento francés sobre el español -mucho más patente, desde lue-
go, que el que sobre este último había ejercido el inglés- permite explicar una no 
pequeña coincidencia de sentimientos y objetivos entre el liberalismo doceañista 
y el francés de 1791.11 
1.2. The Constitution of the United States
Less interest has provoked the hypothetical influence of the Constitution of the 
United States. Even the constitutionalists themselves gathered in Cádiz tried to put 
distance between themselves and the Americans, especially when that constitu-
tional process -their predecessor being the Articles of Confederation- had taken 
place as a consequence of their emancipation from the British crown ... and the 
Spanish overseas territories could follow the same path. It is not an opinion or 
speculation, the Conde de Toreno himself, in the session of January 12, 1812, dur-
ing the debates of Article 324 regarding the representations in the Diputaciones 
Provinciales (Provincial Councils), stated that “las diputaciones y ayuntamientos 
deben considerarse como unos Agentes del poder executivo, y no como cuerpos 
representativos” doing so he pretended to avoid the consequences that could arise 
from that because “... si no lo evitamos se vendría a formar, sobre todo con las 
provincias de ultramar, unas federaciones como las de los Estados-Unidos...” To-
day, the arguments of the deputy from Burgos, Francisco Gutiérrez de la Huerta in 
his opposition to the Constitution of the United States are hilarious. He exposed, 
in regard to religious freedom, that if accepted the American model as a reference, 
8 In Biblioteca Virtual Cervantes he has also published “Los modelos constitucionales en las Cortes de Cádiz” 
quoted next.
9 In that same interview he also assures that “La España de la Constitución de Cádiz sigue a Francia en todo salvo 
en el laicismo. Recommended his essay “Del discurso histórico de las Luces al liberalismo” (Bulletin d´histoire 
contemporaine de l´Espagne. Nº 37-42 (35-48).
10 https://www.lne.es/oviedo/2010/10/04/espana-constitucion-cadiz-sigue-francia-salvo-laicismo/975686.html.
11 http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/los-modelos-constitucionales-en-las-cortes-de-cdiz-0/htm-
l/0062b6f8-82b2-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_6.html#I_1_
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“estableceríamos por dogma la tolerancia” and they should face the danger of 
“fuéramos tomados por tolerantes”.12 
As seen, the American constitution presented serious problems for liberals or 
absolutists to accept it. The liberals advocated for a strong central government, which 
was opposed to the federalist American principles; the absolutists could not admit 
the republican principles even equating the figure of the king to that of the president.
For Varela, in the aforementioned essay of the Biblioteca Virtual Cervantes, “Los 
Diputados liberales incluso repudiaron de forma expresa el modelo constitucional de 
los Estados Unidos en alguna ocasión.”13 Similar approach to that of Manuel Martín-
ez Sospedra in La Constitución de 1812 y el primer liberalismo español: el con-
stitucionalismo liberal a principios del s. XIX when he says “... el modelo norteam-
ericano era de muy difícil asimilación” if at all “... podía servir a lo sumo como 
ejemplo de cómo organizar la relación ejecutivo-parlamento...” (41). Of a identical 
nature is the reasoning of José Manuel Vera Santos, who offers a suggestive study in 
“Los precedentes franceses y estadounidenses y su influencia en la rigidez con-
stitucional de la Constitución Española de 1812”; focusing exclusively in legal as-
pects, he reaches the conclusion that “El reflejo del modelo norteamericano en nues-
tro texto de 1812 queda muy diluido.” (505). Fidel Gómez Ochoa shares the same 
criteria when affirming in “Antifederalismo en España en las primeras décadas de la 
época liberal (1810-1837)” that “Muy significativamente, los liberales gaditanos re-
chazaron expresamente tener a Estados Unidos como posible referente revolucionar-
io a seguir.” (82) and explicitly points out the true causes why the American federal-
ist model could not be applied in Spain,
Se trataba para ellos de un fenómeno americano extendido peligrosamente por el 
Nuevo Mundo, donde España tenía posesiones que no quería perder y para las 
cuales muchos consideraban el gobierno republicano federativo o un sistema de 
vinculación federal a la monarquía como el más adecuado. (82)
Recently some works have been published defending an alternative point of view. 
Antonio Fernández García in Las Cortes y la Constitución de Cádiz highlights the 
coincidences between both constitutions, “...  la Declaración de Derechos de Virgin-
ia y la propia Constitución norteamericana ofrecen bastantes paralelismos y coinci-
dencias con el texto español” (51). It can also be mentioned the reference to this 
topic in the thesis of Jairdilson Da Paz Silva (2014)14 where he states that “... otro 
modelo constitucional también era conocido y manejado por los diputados; modelo 
este que traía una opción menos radical que el texto francés, el constitucionalismo 
norteamericano” (45). In the minutes of the sessions we observed, as Varela affirmed, 
that at specific moments the most erudite speakers referred to the American text. We 
even have the case of the deputy Antonio José Ruiz de Padrón, from Canary Islands, 
12 En Diario de las Discusiones y actas de las Cortes. Tomo 11 (212). This same deputy also mentioned the United 
States during the debates on religious freedom “Diario de las Discusiones y Actas de las Cortes. Tomo VIII p. 96”.
13 Continuing with Varela, the overseas constitutionalists of Latinamerica deserve special mention, “A los diputa-
dos americanos [de los territorios españoles de ultramar] no les satisfacía, en cambio, ni el modelo constitucio-
nal británico ni el francés de 1791. [...] Si acaso sus simpatías se inclinasen por el [modelo] de los Estados 
Unidos.”
14 The date corresponds to the defense of his thesis at the University of Salamanca. Later published in book in 
2016 (see bibliography). The thesis is not about Spanish or North American constitutionalism.
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who met with George Washington and Benjamin Franklin in Philadelphia during his 
stay in the United States at the end of the 18th century.15 In 2012 Moreno Alonso 
announced that he had discovered, in the Sección de raros (Rare section) of the Bib-
lioteca Nacional in Madrid, a copy of the Constitution of the United States translated 
to Spanish, and dated in 1811.16 In this edition it is mentioned that in those years it 
was “moda publicar voluminosos proyectos de Constitución”, ending with the em-
phatic affirmation that “todos suponen tan buena la de Estados Unidos”.17 Moreno 
Alonso concludes, logically, that this “prueba, de forma fehaciente, el conocimiento 
que se tuvo en Cádiz de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos antes de la promul-
gación de ` La Pepa´”.18 In any case, it is the official website of the Spanish Congress, 
where the Constitution of the United States is recognized as one of the references 
considered by the Junteros de Cádiz,
La separación de poderes [en la Constitución de 1812], la más rígida de nuestra 
historia, siguió el modelo de la constitución francesa de 1791 y la de los Estados 
Unidos, lo cual impidió el nacimiento del régimen parlamentario en España.
2. The historical enactment in the Constitutions of the United States and 
Spanish of 1812
This essay does not pretend to take side by any of the aforementioned theories on the 
hypothetical influences that previous constitutions had in the Spanish text of 1812. 
From my point of view they all grow from the same spirit and liberal principles; 
being so, it is obvious that there are philosophical, political, and doctrinal coinci-
dences. The legislation of the constitutional texts is a faithful reflection of the prin-
ciples of liberalism that had derived from the ideological premises of the Enlighten-
ment whose origin is found in Locke and his Two Treatises of Government (1689),19 
with the subsequent conceptual development of Montesquieu in De l’esprit des loix 
(1748), expanded by Rousseau in Le contrat social ou Principes du droit politique 
(1762). Let´s mention just one example; the legislative framework of both constitu-
tions is built on the political foundation of liberalism: the principle of the division of 
powers and the control mechanisms of one respect to another (“Check and Balanc-
es”). This is what I analyzed in my Nexos liberales: la Constitución de los Estados 
Unidos y la española de 1812 (2018).
Being the liberal ideal the cornerstone of the American and Spanish constitutions, 
it is no less true that in both cases there were a series of coincidences of historical 
nature; these conditioned, in one way or another, the final result. The five that I con-
sider decisive would be:
15 He even published a sermon in English against the Inquisition. The sermon was printed and widely distributed.
16 Published in the printing press of Ximenez Carreño in Cádiz.
17 Quoted in Jairdilson Da Paz Silva p. 44 (f.n. 138). At the same time Da Paz quotes José María Portillo Valdés, 
“Entre la monarquía y la nación: cortes y constitución en el espacio imperial español” Also at http://www.el-
mundo.es/elmundo/2012/03/19/andalucia/1332149301.html
18 In La aventura de la historia, nº 161; p. 55. Manuel Moreno Alonso is author of La Constitución de Cádiz, una 
mirada crítica; (Ed. Alfar, 2012).
19 Anonymously published fearing the reprisals that he might suffer. He wrote it in response to Patriarcha (1680) 
by Sir Robert Filmer, and Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes.
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1) Both constitutional processes emerged as the result of a war.
2) In the United States and also in Spain there was previous legislation that had 
to be overcome.
3) In both cases two large groups, with opposing interests and wills, were 
formed; the result came from negotiation between them.
4) In both nations, there were ethical-moral conditions that conditioned the fi-
nal agreements.
5) If the original goal of each constitution was reached it was due to the will, 
determination, and leadership capacity of two characters of unquestionable 
liberal principles: Madison and Argüelles.
2.1. The constitutions resulting from a war
The analysis of any text - literary, biblical, political ... - can be approached from in-
tertextual, religious, legal ... and also historical principles. From this last perspective 
a constitutional text is the result of the social environment in which it is written and 
for which it is written. The “Preamble” of the French Constitution of 1791 is written 
with the intention of clearly showing the rupture with the overthrown monarchy. 
That is the reason why its intention is abolishing “irrevocably the institutions that 
hurt freedom and equal rights”; for this reason it is emphasized that “There is no 
longer nobility, nor procerate [pairie], nor hereditary distinctions, nor distinctions of 
orders, nor feudal regime, nor patrimonial justices...” More recently the German 
Constitution, technically called Fundamental Law for the German Federal Republic 
(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), 1949, also proves the principle 
of breaking with its immediate past. The historical reality of Nazism is undoubtedly 
responsible for the fact that Article 1 focuses on “The protection of human dignity” 
and that the first sentence of the article is: “Human dignity is intangible”, to defend 
in the second subsection the “inviolability of human rights”.20 The current Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 mentions in the first section of Article 1 the “pluralismo políti-
co” as a “valor superior”; a clear reminiscence of the 40 years of dictatorship with 
the prohibition of political parties.
The Constitution of the United States was drafted in 1787, four years after the end 
of the war against the British crown in 1783; the Spanish of 1812 in the heat of the 
War of Independence against France. Both events conditioned the mood of the rep-
resentatives gathered on both sides of the Atlantic.
In the United States, the imprint of the war conflict is unquestionably appreciated 
in the “Articles of the Confederation”, an antecedent of the constitutional text. In the 
writing of those 13 articles, the war recently ended was taken into account, instead 
of the times of peace that were to come. Its fundamental objective was to protect 
each state and help any other in case of foreign attack (Article 3); it also favors the 
creation of militias, allowing each state “the appointment of junior military officers 
to the rank of colonel” (Article 7). The spirit of these two articles remained as such 
in the Constitution; especially the creation of militias, intimately linked to the Sec-
20 It is even more explicit in its rejection of the Nazi spirit in articles 9 - where associations opposed to “... the idea 
of  understanding between peoples” are prohibited - and 139 guaranteeing “Maintenance of the validity of de-
nazification provisions”.
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ond Amendment relating possession of personal weapons.21 American constitution-
alists had to choose, as a starting point, between two a priori antagonistic plans: the 
Virginia Plan defended by James Madison, and the New Jersey Plan defended by 
William Paterson. But, although it is barely mentioned and is unknown to many, a 
third plan was presented: the Hamilton Plan. Although many of the delegates admit-
ted that it was well structured and responded to the demands, it was rejected. Amer-
ican congressmen rejected any connection with Great Britain because of the recent 
war, and Hamilton Plan resembled too much the British model. 
The influence of war is also unequivocal in the Spanish case. The document was 
drafted in a historical context of war and the war zeitgeist in Cádiz indirectly and 
directly influenced the final result. Indirectly through the appointment of the “substi-
tutes”, who, due to the difficulties in the displacements, replaced the “oficial hold-
ers”.22 The use of substitutes was especially necessary to complete the representation 
of the overseas territories; it was an intermediate solution to satisfy the demands of 
those who advocated delaying the process until the representatives of these provinc-
es were present.23 At that time there were present in Cádiz 177 people from the over-
seas territories, and they elected 29 substitutes to represent the provinces from Nueva 
España in the North to Tierra de Fuego in the South.24 The group consisted of 16 
soldiers and almost a dozen Creole merchants waiting for the ships back to America; 
most of them were very active and had a powerful influence on the final result. Be-
yond this type of specific aspects, the truth is that the Constitution of Cadiz is “el 
principal producto de la Guerra de Independencia” (127) as pointed out by Marcos 
F. Masso Garrote in “Significado y aportes de la Constitución de Cádiz de 1812 en el 
Constitucionalismo español e iberoamericano”. 
In the United States, the terms Revolutionary and Independence period are used 
interchangeably and although in Spain the revolutionary expression is banished, it is 
no less true that the transformation of ideas proposed by liberals in Cadiz, was a true 
revolution. When Americans and Spaniards revolted against the British and French 
respectively, they were advocating not only for independence, but for an authentic 
political revolution. The wars of American and Spanish independence were the op-
portunity that the most progressive minds in those two nations were expecting in 
order to put an end with the absolutist regime represented by the English and Spanish 
monarchies. Both, in the United States and in Spain, those who advocated for radical 
social changes saw in the crisis situation represented by the war, and in its conse-
quences, the propitious moment to initiate a series of transformations in their socie-
ties based on a new ideology and social conception. As Carlos Cossio affirms in “La 
filosofía latinoamericana”, “La historicidad le adviene a las ideas por obra de quienes, 
en correspondencia con las ideas del taumaturgo, las asumen y comparten o las rec-
21 This nexus is explicitly obvious in the constitutions of Virginia (1776, Art. 13); Pennsylvania (1776, Art. 13); 
Maryland (1776, Art. 25); North Carolina (1776, Art. 17); New York (1777, Art. 40); Vermont (1777, Art. 1); 
and Massachusetts (1780, Art. 17).
22 The importance of the substitutes was such that even the constitutional text that emerged in Cadiz legislated 
about substitute deputies, establishing their number in 54 for the peninsula and 30 for the overseas territories.
23 The only American present at the beginning of the sessions was the representative of Puerto Rico, Ramón Pow-
er, who would occupy the vice presidency of the Cortes.
24 This election was immediately contested in the Spanish territories of América. For the “Gaceta de Buenos Ai-
res” it was “un puñado de aventureros sin carácter ni representación”; (in Marie-Laure Rieu-Millan, “Los dipu-
tados americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz: Elecciones y representatividad”. Quinto Centenario; nº 14. Madrid: 
Universidad Complutense; 1988. p. 57).
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hazan con una suficiente dimensión colectiva que todos ellos constituyen conjunta-
mente como un ‘nosotros’” (189). 
2.2. Overcoming previous legislation
The states of the Union, it has been mentioned, had the Articles of the Confederation 
as a legal framework for the relationship between themselves. The Spaniards had the 
Leyes Fundamentales; these were a result of tradition and historical evolution rather 
than a formal legislative development.25 The entry into force of the new constitution-
al texts presupposed the repeal of previous Articles and Laws.
The seed of the American Constitution was planted in the Mount Vermont Con-
ference on March 21, 1785, which concluded with the signing of the Mount Vermont 
Compact on the 28th of the same month between the representatives of Virginia and 
Maryland. It was a 13-point document that would govern navigation on the Potomac 
and Pocomoke rivers and the Chesapeake Bay. In addition, other agreements on 
trade regulation, import taxes, or fishing rights were also established. Madison pro-
posed a new meeting, this time to extend the agreement to all the states of the Union. 
The Annapolis Convention held between September 11 and 14, 1786, was a some-
what failure -not all the states sent delegates-; but it was clear that it was necessary 
to reform the Articles of Confederation26 to promote trade, and there was a consensus 
about calling a new meeting in Philadelphia. The American delegates went to that 
city with the original intention of remodeling27 the Articles of the Confederation to 
facilitate trade, but they found themselves with the proposal of a new constitutional 
text. To repeal the Articles, it was necessary the unanimity of the 13 states; this was 
impossible because of the absence of Rhode Island, which had decided not to send 
delegates suspecting what was going on. Rhode Island feared that, being a small 
state, its decision-making capacity would be drastically cut, being subordinated to 
the interests of the most powerful -populated- states. This concern was shared by the 
southern states, less populated than those in the north, if only the white population 
was considered. The main problem was referred to representativeness: no state 
should have its rights reduced by current legislation depleted. The obstacle was 
solved adopting a bicameral system: in one, the House of Representatives, the rep-
resentation would be proportional to the inhabitants of the states; in the other, the 
Senate, the representation would be equal for all of them regardless of their popula-
tion. It was also established that the final text should be endorsed by 2/3 of the states 
for its entry into force.
In Spain, the problem of a hypothetical illegality had to do with the position of 
absolutists, for whom the Constitution represented a serious danger by cutting histor-
ical rights of the king, and also because it was contrary to the interests of the nation. 
For these the current Leyes Fundamentales represented (and/or were a result of) the 
bilateral pact between the monarch and the citizens (subjects); so being the king 
absent the pact could not be unilaterally broken. They assumed that the laws in force 
represented in themselves a centennial constitution that could be reformed in specif-
25 Already with the Trastámara dynasty the mentioning was to “leyes perpetuas e por siempre verdaderas”.
26 Formally, Meeting of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government. 
27 Literally “... for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress 
and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions.” As Madison mentions in Federalist Paper nº 40; 
18th January; 1788.
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ic nuances, but rejected any alteration in its essence and/or spirit. In addition, the 
French invasion had led to the empowerment of the Juntas Provinciales and the 
subsequent Junta Suprema Central, which assumed the representation of national 
sovereignty by having the support of the people. Miguel Artola in La burguesía rev-
olucionaria, mentions how after the popular uprisings there was a “traslación de 
poder  al que acompaña el sentimiento generalizado de una reasunción popular de la 
soberanía...” (14). Alcalá Galiano also echoed the event in Índice de la revolución de 
España en 1808, stating that “Se concedió a las Juntas potestad absoluta, igual a la 
del rey a quien representaban, acaso mayor en cierto modo; en suma, una dictadura 
militar.”28
It was the Junta Central itself who already in its first session (October 7, 1808) 
proposed the calling to Cortes, which would finally materialize in May 1809. Re-
garding the reserves of the absolutists, it was Agustín de Argüelles who managed to 
solve the stumbling block through the “Discurso Preliminar” which will be dis-
cussed later.
2.3. Ideological groups and negotiation
The final documents in Philadelphia and Cádiz were the result of negotiations be-
tween the two groups that were formed, in both cases, with opposed, when not con-
fronted, principles  and interests. The two that were established in the United States 
had to do with the population in the states. Two opposing factions were established: 
on the one hand, there were the most populated states; on the other, those with the 
smaller population. Except for specific exceptions, these two groups also corre-
sponded to geographical demarcations, corresponding to northern states vs. southern 
states. In the Spanish case, the delegates were also concentrated in two large groups 
according to their political principles: the liberals and the absolutists. The points of 
debate and conflict between the groups of the two nations were numerous and, both 
in one and the other, the final result was the result of negotiation rather than imposi-
tion. All the discrepancies could be summarize stating that there was a conflict of 
interests between those who defended the old economic and social system - repre-
sentatives of southern states and absolutists - and those - representatives of the north-
ern states and liberals – who advocated for a new social model of bourgeois society 
that, beyond such aspects as national sovereignty, favored individual liberties and 
guaranteed trade and private property.
In the United States, the substantial issue of controversy had to do with represent-
ativeness. The aforementioned Virginia and New Jersey Plans clearly explained the 
discrepancies. The bicameral system, with a House of Representatives and a Senate, 
was a solution that satisfied everyone. But to reach this agreement the negotiations 
between the groups interested other points such as tax models and referents and, very 
especially, the “numerical value” that was conferred to black slaves. The slave states 
of the south defended that they should be counted as a citizen even if they lacked 
rights; this would imply that states with a lower white population had greater rep-
resentation due to slavery population. The 3/5 agreement proposed by James Wilson 
and Roger Sherman was reached: every 5 slaves would be counted as 3 white citi-
28 Quoted in Antonio Moliner i Prada, p. 86.
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zens for purposes of representation, presidential election, and “possessions” for tax 
payment.
In Spain, the most important point of conflict was that relating to National Sover-
eignty. Liberals defended that it was a prerogative of the people, and as derivation, 
in their representatives in the Cortes; the absolutists, on the contrary, considered the 
king as the depository of such an attribute. The discrepancy was resolved through 
negotiation. For example, in Article 3 on National Sovereignty the adverb esencial-
mente was introduced to satisfy the demands of the realists: “La soberanía reside 
esencialmente en la Nación española.” It was an intended ambiguity with the pur-
pose of avoiding to stir up the absolutists not eliminating radically the authority of 
the king. In the session of the first day José María Guridi Alcocer proposed to be 
replaced by radicalmente, “... para que se entienda con claridad lo que le es esencial 
a la Nación, y el modo de residir en ella la soberanía.” His proposal was seconded 
the following day by Juan de Lera because “la Nación en todo tiempo ha tenido en sí 
radicalmente la soberanía o poder de gobernarse”. The Conde de Toreno explained 
that by using the adverb esencialmente the reference was to the very origin of the 
nation; the concepts of sovereignty and nation coexisted because “La Nación no 
puede desprenderse de su soberanía, como el hombre no puede desprenderse de sus 
facultades físicas”.29 Another deliberate nuance was the use of the adjective “moder-
ate” in article 14 when defining the Spanish Monarchy: “El Gobierno de la Nación 
española es una Monarquía moderada hereditaria.” It was again the Conde of Toreno 
who, in the session of 4 October 4, 1810, clarified the meaning of the adjective by 
explaining that the government is a “moderate monarchy” because “es gobierno de 
un hombre a quien rige y enfrena la ley, para que en el ejercicio de su poder atienda 
el bien común”. 
2.4. Ethical-moral constraints
German J. Bidart Campos states in “Estado y Constitución” that “... todo estado tiene 
una Constitución porque está constituido de una manera determinada,...” (25) and 
both constitutional processes had to confront two complicated issues that were his-
torically imbricated in the social networks of each country and interested ethi-
cal-moral aspects: slavery in the United States and the Inquisition in Spain. As al-
ready mentioned, any constitution is a product of the social model for which it is 
generated and in which it is generated; slavery and Inquisition were part of the social 
imaginary in the United States and Spain. However, to deal with this unhuman 
anachronism within the ideology and liberal principles was very difficult. Again the 
interests of the two large groups just referred to, were at odds. The profile of the 
American representatives was eminently mercantilist, the Spaniards were funda-
mentally religious; this was translated into the protection of economic interests and 
of Catholic religion respectively.
Slavery was already a subject of intense debate in American society. The eminent 
and popular John Jay in a letter to R. Lushington (New York, March 15, 1786), ex-
pressed himself in the following terms, “It is much to be wished that slavery may be 
29 This and previous quotes taken from Antonio Torres del Moral p. 91 in f.n. 67 refers to “Intervención del Conde 
de Toreno, DSCG de 28 de agosto de 1811.”
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abolished.”30 Paradoxically 25 of the 55 delegates at the convention owned slaves;31 
George Washington, who owned more than 100 slaves, described slavery as “dis-
gusting”, James Mason as “diabolical”, Dickinson as “inadmissible” ... However, the 
ethical-moral conditions were relegated to the background. They approach this mat-
ter from a commercial and political perspective; as John Rutledge of South Carolina 
emphasized, “Religion and humanity had nothing to do with this question.” 32
Economy in southern states depended on the slave system; to abolish legal slav-
ery would mean their economic ruin. Charles C. Pinckney, also a delegate from 
South Carolina, emphasized that “South Carolina can never receive the plan if it 
prohibits the Slave-trade.” Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut stated that “The mo-
rality or wisdom of Slavery is considerations belonging to the States themselves. 
What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their 
particular interest.” As a matter of fact, representatives admitted that the slave sys-
tem was “tolerable”; the substantial problem was the representation that black popu-
lation could confer to southern states. If the slaves were computed numerically like 
the white one, those states would obtain greater representation although around 40% 
of their population were blacks. It would also be an inconsistency because slaves had 
no right to vote. But it was also an incongruity to recognize them as “possession”, 
when determining wealth and the subsequent payment of taxes, and not when estab-
lishing representation.
Once again, pragmatism prevailed in a subtle economic-political symbiosis. It 
was admitted a moratorium of 20 years -until January 1, 1808- to eliminate slave 
importation in the southern states; in turn they had to pay a tax of $10 for each new 
slave arriving in US territory. The aforementioned Three Fifths Compromise -5 black 
slaves were “counted” as 3 free citizens- was achieved. The convention also ap-
proved the Fugitive Slave Act guaranteeing the return of escaped and captured slaves 
to their rightful owners.33 But the most revealing fact within the constitutional text 
was the exclusion of the word “slave” or any derivative, replaced by the expression 
“all other persons”.34
In Spain the issue of the necessary validity of the Inquisition was also a matter of 
social debate. Officially it had been abolished by Napoleon in the Decretos de 
Chamartin (December 4, 1808)35; but as the rest of its provisions, they were never 
30 http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-r-lushington/
31 At that time there were about 500,000 slaves, representing 1/5 of the total population. About 80% in the south-
ern states.
32 He even proposed that it be explicitly stated that the Federal Government could not legislate on matters concern-
ing the slave trade. Luther Martin of Maryland -himself owner of slaves - opposed this measure because in the 
case of a slave rebellion the solution would interest the entire nation and not a single state; so it was the respon-
sibility of the Federal Government. This quote as the immediately following ones of Pinckney and Ellsworth are 
picked up by Madison in entrance corresponding to the session of August 21.
33 Sanctioned in Art. 4, Secc. 2; 3.
34 Art. 1, Secc. 2; 3: Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be 
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not 
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. (this text would be modified in the 14th Amendment) 
35 Despite Napoleon’s wishes in the Estatuto de Bayona, the Inquisition was not outlawed in order to “evitar las 
disputas que pudieran excitarse sobre su inteligencia y calmar los temores o escrúpulos de algunas personas 
excesivamente suspicaces”. (In Actas de Bayona, p. 72. Quoted in Jean-Baptiste Busaall, “Nature Juridique de 
la monarchie espagnole sous Joseph Bonaparte” (235-254) Mélanges de la Casa de Velazquez, 2005. 35: 1) 
Nevertheless José Bonaparte considered that the Inquisition had been abolished with the referred Estatuto be-
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assumed by the Spaniards. Within the constitutional debates, it was Diego Muñoz-Tor-
rero who, in its first intervention, exposed the urgency to abolish the Inquisition. 
Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva, and Antonio Oliveros, clerics like Muñoz-Torrero him-
self, also opposed its validity, as did the majority of liberal deputies with Espiga y 
Gadea as spokesman. They exposed humanistic and legal reason to do so: the outdat-
ed institution despised the value of the person; the procedures imposed contradicted 
the laws and fundamental principles of law. However prominent voices of liberalism 
as priest Vicente Terrero –he even came to question the real legitimacy or the monar-
chical state- vehemently opposed its derogation. Due to this matter, and though Ter-
rero was a convinced liberal, he has been considered as a paradigm of the reactionary 
positioning of the clergy and the church in general. For these, the inquisitorial pro-
cedures were not inhuman or unjust. In addition, religion was suffering continuous 
attacks from the French occupation, and considered licit any action to preserve the 
Catholic principles. They argued that the Santo Tribunal was the most appropriate 
mean of guaranteeing religious unity in Spain against the attacks of Reformists and 
Jansenists. And, finally, they assured that if the Inquisition was suppressed people 
would revolt against Government.
Liberals understood that having been the Santo Oficio a monarchical prerogative 
with Papal acquiescence, the Cortes, as depositories of national sovereignty, were 
competent to deal with matters that previously only corresponded to religious insti-
tutions, assuming that they were legally entitled to abolish the Inquisition. The abso-
lutists, on the contrary, understood that such a provision could not be legally sanc-
tioned, since this required the authorization of the Pope; denying the Cortes legislative 
capacity on this issue.
As in the United States regarding slavery, pragmatism was also imposed in Spain. 
Absolutist postulates were finally accepted; cleric deputies, the most numerous, 
would have never admitted a constitution in which the Inquisition was abolished. 
The Church was by far the most powerful organization in the nation and the goal was 
to avoid sterile clashes. In 1835 Agustín de Arguelles recognized that during the 
constitutional debates, and especially in matters of religious nature, liberals made a 
series of concessions to the clergy believing that later some of the adopted provisions 
could be reformed.36 The ecclesiastical establishment welcomed the final text. Of 
course, the Inquisition was not repealed and, in addition, the Catholic religion was 
perpetuated, as was its incompatibility with other religions as stated in Article 12.37 
Example of this is the paraphernalia that accompanied its approval. His proclamation 
took place with a mass and a Te Deum; it was also agreed that the text should be re-
ferred in all the parishes during a special mass of thanksgiving.
cause in article 98 of Title XI (“Del orden judicial”) it was established that “La justicia se administrará en 
nombre del Rey, por juzgados y tribunales que él mismo establecerá. Por tanto, los tribunales que tienen atribu-
ciones especiales, y todas las justicias de abadengo, órdenes y señorío, quedan suprimidas, being the court of 
the Santa Inquisición a “tribunal con atribuciones especiales.” At the meeting of July 26, 1808, José Bonaparte 
summoned the clergy - parish priests, prelates, canons, and auxiliary bishop - leaving out the Inquisidor Gener-
al, Ramon de Arce, and the members of the Corte Suprema de la Inquición whom he had met in Bayonne in June 
of that same year.
36 The Spanish Inquisition was abolished four times: Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808; the Cortes de Cádiz in 1813, 
during the Liberal Triennium in 1820, and finally and definitively in 1834 during the government of Francisco 
Martínez de la Rosa, within the regency of María Cristina de Borbón.
37 “La religión de la Nación española es y será perpetuamente la católica, apostólica, romana, única verdadera. La 
Nación la protege por leyes sabias y justas y prohíbe el ejercicio de cualquiera otra.”
Gurpegui, J. A. Complut. j. Engl. stud. 26 2018: 9-2522
2.5. James Madison y Agustín de Arqüelles
Any historical process follows its own dynamics beyond those who are its architects; 
being this an unquestionable reality it is not less true that the personal characteristics 
of the protagonists will mark in one way or another the development of such an 
event. In the case of the United States and Spain, the final result would have been 
significantly different if not for two personalities with strong liberal convictions and 
clear political determination: James Madison and Agustín de Argüelles. In addition 
to conviction and determination another common feature of both was cunning; with-
out it neither one nor the other would have managed to have the final document 
signed. The American and the Spanish assumed and understood that, indeed, crises 
are camouflaged opportunities.
James Madison was instrumental in the initiation, development, approval, and 
subsequent ratification of the Constitution of the United States. The original purpose 
was to reform the aforementioned Articles, but Madison’s intentions were very dif-
ferent: it was about writing a new constitution. He managed to convince a reluctant 
George Washington, the most prestigious political personality, to participate and 
even got him to occupy the presidency. Madison arrived in Philadelphia a week in 
advance and held meetings with delegates of his own opinion. Already in the first 
session he made his position clear and proposed the Virginia Plan, previously draft-
ed, as the discussion document. During the sessions, he was the most active protag-
onist and much of the information that has come to us has been thanks to his dili-
gence taking note of what happened. His capacity for conviction and negotiation was 
fundamental in such complex matters as representativeness, the election of presi-
dent, tax policy, commercial agreements ... etc. The signing of the document was on 
the verge of being frustrated when, having already been completed, the issue of indi-
vidual rights that were not included in the Constitution arose. Once again it was 
Madison who managed to convince the most reluctant delegates to postpone that 
debate, and subsequent inclusion, when it had been ratified by the states. The neces-
sary ratification was much more difficult than expected, precisely because of the 
absence of the aforementioned individual rights. It was not only in the southern 
states; in others like Massachusetts or New York, the opposition was also considera-
ble. The New York Journal began publishing a series of articles signed by “Cato”38 
opposing ratification; the “Federalist Papers” emerged as a reaction to those writings 
and the pseudonym “Publius” hid the names of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. The 
most important of the 85 articles was number 10, whose authorship is awarded to 
Madison. 39
Agustín de Argüelles was the Spanish James Madison. Jovellanos said that he 
was “el oráculo de las Cortes”; he also described him in these terms: “Hay segura-
mente en las Cortes hombres de instrucción y de juicio, entre los cuales descuella, 
según dicen, nuestro Agustín Argüelles, quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupres-
si...”40 His passion and vehemence in his interventions and his way of reasoning 
38 Maybe George Clinton, governor of New York, although its authorship cannot be proved.
39 None of the three authors claimed authorship; it is admitted that Hamilton wrote 51, Madison of 29, and Jay 
of 5. 
40 “¿Y sabe usted que nuestro Agustín Argüelles es el oráculo de las Cortes? No conozco bien sus principios, 
aunque le tengo por muy instruido y también por hombre de juicio, y esto me consuela mucho.” Previous quote 
and this one in letters written December 5, 1810. Both letters in Aula Virtual Cervantes; http://www.cervantes-
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earned him the nickname of “El Divino” or “Aristides41 Español”. Paradoxically, he 
was not a “titular” or “oficial holder” deputy, but a substitute by Asturias, and he 
became the authentic “Father of the Constitution of 1812”. He participated in the 
most important commissions, especially those with ideological content,42 presiding 
three of them, acting as secretary in two, and as a member in five others. The biggest 
obstacle that the liberals had to overcome in Cádiz was the reticence of the monar-
chists regarding the legality of the entire development of a new constitution. They 
understood that the current Leyes Fundamentales could not be repealed or replaced 
without the consent of the king, deriving from it the illegality of the whole process. 
Argüelles´ strategy focused on demonstrating that it was not a rupture, but a contin-
uation, or derivation, with a legislative tradition that went back to the Visigoths, as 
he argued and defended in his “Discurso Preliminar”,
... nada ofrece la Comisión en su proyecto que no se halle consignado del modo 
más auténtico y solemne en los diferentes cuerpos de la legislación española  en el 
que estuviese contenido con enlace, armonía y concordancia cuanto tienen dis-
puesto las leyes fundamentales...
It was an allegation of clear historicist43 background in which he tried to link the text 
that was being questioned with the traditional medieval laws that were still in force. 
Through this exercise of supposed aggiornamento he managed to veil his true inten-
tions: to modernize Spain by burying the old regime. With such a purpose in mind he 
made significant concessions, for example he accepted that “la religión católica, 
apostólica, romana, es y será siempre la religión de la Nación española, con ex-
clusión de cualquiera otra.” In his speech he also took advantage of the popular re-
jection to the French by exposing, somehow demagogically, the intentions of Napo-
leon, who “para usurpar el trono de España, intentó establecer, como principio 
incontestable, que la Nación era una propiedad de la familia Real...”
* * *
The historical reality that was being lived in the United States and Spain at some 
convulsive and uncertain moments between the XVIII/XIX centuries, originated and 
outlined the final result. The application of the constitutional texts that emerged in 
Philadelphia and Cadiz was far from being guaranteed when they were signed; the 
virtual.com/obra-visor/cartas-a-lord-holland-sobre-la-forma-de-reunion-de-las-cortes-de-cadiz--0/html/
ffe047b8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_1.html. “... quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi”: “... as cy-
presses are accustomed among the flexible wickerwork” (“cuanto acostumbran los cipreses entre las flexibles 
mimbreras”); quoting Virgilio´s Eclogues 1,vv. 24-25. When Melibeo questions Títiro about his impression of 
Rome, which he has just visited, he answers: “... this city rose his head among the rest of the cities as cypresses 
are accustomed among the flexible wickerwork (“... esta ciudad levantó tanto su cabeza entre las demás ciu-
dades cuanto acostumbran los cipreses entre las flexibles mimbreras.”
41  Aristides (530–468 BC) was an ancient Athenian statesman nicknamed “the Just”.
42  He opposed torture and slavery for being “opuesto a la pureza y liberalidad de la nación española” advocated 
abolishing the Inquisition; he defended the legal equality of all citizens, the separation church-state, and of the 
separation of powers in three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.
43 In its writing it counted with the collaboration of the archdeacon José de Espiga y Gadea; but he took the histor-
icist framework from Ensayo histórico-crítico sobre la antigua legislación de los reinos de León y Castilla, 
(Madrid, 1808) whose author was the priest Francisco Martínez Marina.
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fate of those two constitutions was also determined by the historical reality of the 
moment; those who opposed their application were numerous and powerful. In the 
United States, all obstacles were overcome; not so in Spain. When the monarch Fer-
nando VII returned to Spain, 69 deputies of the Cortes Ordinarias (1813-1814, para-
doxically elected by virtue of the legislation passed in Cádiz), signed on April 12, 
1814, a document known as “Manifiesto de los Persas”44 opposing “La Pepa” as the 
constitution was popularly known due to the date –festivity of Saint Joseph- it has 
been passed. This Manifesto offered the king the necessary excuse to sign -on May 
4, 1814- the repeal of the Constitution of 1812 reestablished the principles of the 
Viejo Régimen by proclaiming: “La Constitución soy yo”.
However, we cannot ignore that the intrinsic nature of each constitution was de-
terminant in the American and deterministic in the Spanish one: while that of the 
United States looked and had a clear vocation for the future, that of Spain looked and 
was weighed down by the past ... and that always ends up being paid.
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